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What I believe about easy knowledge
08/04/28
I've been thinking about this since the conference a couple of weeks ago.
The problem of easy knowledge is alleged to put the kibosh on reliabilism.* Consider, for example, a situation in which I make a series of perceptual judgments. There are many piles of cardboard tokens on the t -
Two realisms enter, only one can leave
08/04/14
I gave my Saturday over to the UAlbany Grad Student Philosophy Conference, and I am glad I did. There were some very good papers. Props are due to the grad students who organized it. This post records a thought I had during the conference. I'll start by explaining the point in terms of Philip K
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What I believe about easy knowledge
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