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What scientists know
12/06/30
I put a draft of my paper, What scientists know is not a function of what scientists know, on my website and on the PhilSci archive a couple of weeks ago. I'll be presenting it at the PSA in November.
ABSTRACT: There are two senses of 'what scientists know': An individual s -
What I'm reading now
12/06/29
In What to believe now [Amazon/GoodReads], David Coady sets out to do applied epistemology. Most of the book is about expertise and democracy,* which is fine. With the caveat that I haven't read it all, I'll lament that fact that most of the book seems to be Coady summarizing and critiquin -
Counting on universals
12/06/13
In A Quinean Critique of Ostrich Nominalism (March 2012) Bryan Pickel and Nicholas Mantegani argue that so-called ostrich nominalism is less parsimonious than realism about universals.
Here's the background: The realist asks what can explain the fact that (for example) all blue thing -
Gaiman on simulated wisdom
12/06/05
In a commencement address at University of the Arts in Philadelphia, Neil Gaiman offers the following advice:
Be wise, because the world needs more wisdom. And if you can not be wise, pretend to be someone who is wise and then just behave like they would.
I first thought that this would be
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What scientists know
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