An essence for existentialism 
[This post is part of a series; see pt 1.]

Here is one concise way of characterizing existentialism:
Existentialists believe that human existence is characterized by a tension between being and becoming. The former is a matter of specific moments, facts, and actions. The latter is a matter of the personality that unifies the actions.
Sartre calls these two aspects facticity and trascendence; failing to reconcile them is bad faith. Kierkegaard calls them temporality and eternity; failing to reconcile them is despair.

With this definition in hand, we can sort the history of philosophy in a sensible way. Sartre, the paradigmatic existentialist, counts as one. So do most of the usual suspects: Kierkegaard, Marcel, Buber, Tillich, Frankl, and so on. The only fellow traveller left out in the cold is Nietzsche, who does not count as an existentialist by this definition.

The definition also excludes Hemingway, Emerson, and all the moody characters who ought to be excluded.

We can make sense of saying that early Heidegger (in Being&Time) is existentialist, but that later Heidegger is not. Similarly, that Sartre's later marxist writings are no longer existentialist. (We could not even sensibly say those things if existentialism was ostensively defined by pointing to the usual subjects or if the definition was so broad as to include anyone mopey.)

Characterizing existentialism in this way also has several nice conceptual consequences. Here are a few:

1. It raises the question of freedom in an interesting way. While you are still alive, there are further actions that you will perform. It is possible that, considered as actions of the same person, your further actions will change the meaning of past actions. Whether past actions were cowardly (to take a common example) is not yet a settled thing. In this sense, you are free. This is not the tired metaphysical question of libertarian free will.

2. It leads us to ask whether and how the tension between the two aspects of ones existence can be reconciled. For Sartre, 'authenticity' can be defined as resolving the tension; it does not seem as if resolution is possible, so inauthenticity is inevitable. For de Beauvoir, authenticity requires embracing what the tension (which she calls ambiguity); the tension cannot be resolved, but recognizing this is a precondition for authenticity. For Kierkegaard, the tension can be resolved by a leap of faith. For Marcel, it can be resolved by commitment to a human community.

3. It leads us to ask whether this description of human existence applies to all homo sapiens. For Sartre, the answer is yes. Everyone is necessarily an individual subject. As such, there is a kind of violence in interpersonal relations: As a subject, you make an object out of others, and they make an object out of you. For Marcel the answer is no. An ego can fail to be a person by not relating to others in mutually-recognizing trust. For Heidegger, no. One can fail to be an authentic individual by just being an anonymous anybody. This Heideggerian sense of inathenticity is not about mismanaging the tension between the two aspects of human existence, but rather about failing to be a real human self at all.

Finally, this definition provides a nice pedagogical lens for focusing the material. One could spend a whole semester on Being&Nothingness, but an existentialism course can only include selections. A definition of existentialism provides a way of picking parts that will connect to other readings and helps in cutting out other things.

To sum up: I have long had this definition of existentialism that works historically, conceptually, and pedagogically. So it was somewhat disconcerting to recognize another adequate definition.

Continuing the existentialist serial, I'll leave the other definition for another post: Can any definition save little Friedrich from the abyss? Find out in the next exciting episode!

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See Eff Pee 
Last year's 1st annual Albany grad student conference conference was a great success, and it turns out that the '1st annual' was not mere bluster. The 2nd annual grad conference will focus on political philosophy. Thomas Pogge will be the keynote.

If you are a grad student who lives in the region, and you are working in some area of political philosophy, consider participating. See the official page for details. Submissions are due January 23; the conference itself is March 28.

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Hunting the essence of existentialism 
'Existentialism' has been a bit of vexed jargon in the 20th century. Teaching existentialism this term, I put some thought into the matter. I have started several times to blog about it (eg) but often my ruminations have threatened to overrun the borders of any reasonable blog post.

It is possible to use the term "existentialism" merely as a historical category, to refer to the rogues' gallery of moody philosophers in black turtlenecks who are typically included in anthologies of existentialist writing. Yet this would entirely ignore the reasons why these anthologies were collected in the first place. Although a new collection might include Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and who all else just because the previous collection did, the reading lists were not handed down from heaven on stone tablets. In Existential America-- my bedtime reading earlier this term-- George Cotkin does a nice job of documenting how the canon was formed. It is not merely an accidental grouping of some continental thinkers.

It is also possible to be a nihilist about "existentialism" and suppose that the term means nothing. Yet I would be pulling a bait and switch on students if I my "existentialism" course was mostly about Rawlsian political liberalism, to take an arbitrary non-existentialist topic. So I conclude that term cannot be entirely empty. And even if it were empty in its usual use, one might wonder whether there is any interesting thread running through the thought of the various so-called existentialists.

Steven Crowell, in his Stanford Encyclopedia entry, offers one such thread:
On the existential view, to understand what a human being is it is not enough to know all the truths that natural science... could tell us. ... Nor will it suffice to adopt the point of view of practice and add categories drawn from moral theory: neither scientific nor moral inquiry can fully capture what it is that makes me myself, my "ownmost" self. Without denying the validity of scientific categories (governed by the norm of truth) or moral categories (governed by norms of the good and the right), "existentialism" may be defined as the philosophical theory which holds that a further set of categories, governed by the norm of authenticity, is necessary to grasp human existence.
This seems partly right to me, but too broad. Thoreau and Emerson thought that human existence was not exhausted by the analysis that science or ethics could give of it, and both were concerned with authenticity. Yet there are important differences between the transcendentalists' authenticity and the existentialists'.

So what's existentialism? For years, I've had an answer. But now I think there is an alternate answer that is just as good. It's uncomfortable, because the two answers underwrite different judgments about who is or isn't an existentialist.

I'll say more in another post.

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Existential notes from the campaign 
Via Leiter and Erfani, this curious little gem from Bloomberg columnist Jeremy Gerard describing the debate:
As the world burned, the presidential candidates were sober, lucid, rarely off topic and always in character last night. Watching it was like having to read Sartre on the first day of spring.

This is a curious metaphor, but he probably just means to say that it is something tediously calm in the midst of much activity. Alternately, it may be a reference to the climax of Sartre's Nausea; Sartre wrote as part of a summary of the book:
Roquentin wanders the streets, voluminous and unjustifiable. And then, on the first day of spring, he grasps the meaning of his adventure: Nausea is existence revealing itself -- and existence is not pleasant to see.

The debate (one may say) is the candidates revealing themselves -- and there is much on the present scene that is voluminous and unjustifiable.

In a somewhat related note, Ron mentions to me that he's been noticing the phrase "existential threat" coming up in the campaign; as in the sentence, "A nuclear Iran is an existential threat to Israel." The OED informs me that the sense of "existential" meaning simply pertaining to existence dates back at least to 1693. It does seem a bit archaic or jargony, though. In the 21st-century, the word raises connotations of angst, berets, and black turtlenecks. (Unbidden, one imagines a nuclear Iran laying siege to Israeli cafes. Those guys take up tables all day, never tip, and nihilate their own Nothingness.) I'm not sure why "existential threat" is being used rather than "a threat to the existence of", but puzzling out political idioms is like writing a blog post on a Sunday in October.

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Induction by any other name would smell 
My paper on demonstrative theories of induction is now forthcoming in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. I just sent off my formatted final draft, which I've mirrored on the website.

A couple of years ago, I blogged about the worry that putting papers on-line might wreck the blind review process. My decision then was to post papers on-line under dummy titles, so that referees who were sent my paper would not be confronted by a headline that they might have innocently encountered on-line. I rejected more severe measures, because referees who deliberately violate blinding can probably figure out who I am anyway. I could only avoid that by being so secretive that no one in the field knew about me, but for obvious reasons that is a non-optimal strategy career-wise.

This paper was posted before that decision, but the original title ("Eliminating induction") was too cute and misleading. I changed the title after having decided to use dummy titles, so I kept the original title for the version on my website. The real, final title is "Demonstrative induction and the skeleton of inference." (More accurate. Still somewhat pithy.)

The cost of this dummy-title strategy, which I did not appreciate before, is that dummy titles gain traction in Google Scholar. Since the search engine is not clever enough to tell that a later version is just the same paper under a different title, Google Scholar's information about me gets cluttered with a lot of drafts.

I will persist with the dummy title strategy, however, because the Google Scholar clutter pathology will arise unless the first version I post has exactly the same title as the final version. I am not sure if that has happened with any paper I've written. In this case, for example, I presented an earlier version at a conference under the original title. In other cases, journal referees have asked me to change the title. And (to end with a zinger) E J Udokang can make a whole new article by changing the title's punctuation or spelling.

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