Remember that time I wrote that thing about that stuff 
When my first paper about distributed cognition was under review, one of the referees objected to my account on the grounds that it would count transactive memory as d-cog. Transactive memory is the phenomenon, familiar to couples and longtime friends, in which partners can cue each other to remember something which neither could remember on their own. I hadn't heard of it before, went and did some research, scratched my head as to how this was supposed to be an objection rather than just a natural consequence of my view, and added transactive memory as a further example of d-cog in my paper.

via a friend's link on Facebook and io9, I just stumbled across some recent work on transactive memory by Harris et al. They readily identify it as a kind of distributed cognition; not because of me, I'm sure, but still vindicating me. Their work suggests that (a) different content tends to be preserved in transactive memory than in individual memory and (b) the task of transactive memory is not straightforwardly to remember better than individual memory, but to maintain memories more reliably as resources fail.


Links:

Remembering together, a British Psychological Society Research Digest summary of Harris et al.

Couples as socially distributed cognitive systems (2014) Celia B Harris, Amanda J Barnier, John Sutton, Paul G Keil. Memory Studies. Behind a paywall.

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Mill still and again 
My second paper on JS Mill and natural kinds was written with the working title "Let a Millian flower bloom". Ultimately, I decided that it needed a more informative title. So it will be presented under another a title and published under a third.

I'll be giving a version as a talk at the PSA in November under the title "What the 19th century knew about natural kinds and the 20th forgot".

And the fully developed paper has been accepted for publication in HOPOS under the title "John Stuart Mill on taxonomy and natural kinds".

A late-stage draft is available on my website.

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What I said in Paris, more or less 
The talk I gave in France a few months ago was mostly a paper, but there were parts I hadn't written out. I had bullet points where I was saying things I've shown in other papers or in my book, because I could talk those through just fine without scripting them precisely.

I finally got around to filling in those lacunae, and today I posted a draft.

I am sure there are places where I should say more in order to be clear, but I am not sure where they are. If I elaborated on every point where I could say more, it would recapitulate most of my prior work. So, if you take a look, I'd be glad to hear which parts seem to go by too quickly.

Link: Taxonomy, ontology, and causation

Abstract: When we ask what natural kinds are, there are two different things we might have in mind. The first, which I'll call the taxonomy question, is what distinguishes a category which is a natural kind from an arbitrary class. The second, which I'll call the ontology question, is what manner of stuff there is that realizes the category. When causal accounts of natural kinds are assessed without clearly distinguishing these two questions, they fare poorly. The reason is that causal structure only provides an answer to the ontology question, it does so for many but not all natural kinds, and even where it applies it provides some importantly different kinds of answers. This confusion occurs when philosophers take John Stuart Mill's Kinds to be predecessors of our natural kinds, because it ignores Mill's equal commitment to what he calls natural groups as the right categories for scientific taxonomy. It occurs, too, when philosophers take homeostatic property cluster (HPC) accounts as a candidate definition for `natural kind', because being an HPC is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a natural kind. So we should think of causal accounts as just partial answers to the ontology question. I argue that most philosophers have systematically failed to distinguish these questions but that making doing so would offer several advantages.

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Referee calls foul 
In discussions of peer review, somebody always mentions referees searching the internet to suss out who the author is. There is disagreement about how common this is. Inevitably, somebody recounts rumours about scholars who do this before even reading a paper they've been asked to review, and everybody involved in the conversation mumbles and swears that they never do it.

I do not know how common the search-before-reading approach to refereeing is. I also don't know how pernicious it really is, although the phenomenon of implicit bias suggests that it's probably more pernicious than one would think.

Regardless, it is clearly a perversion of blind peer review. The process is constructed precisely so that the referee can read the paper without knowing the identity of the author.*

So imagine my surprise when I was invited to referee a paper, I logged into Editorial Manager, and one of the Action Links was to do a Google Scholar Title Search. This was the option right below View Submission, which is what I had to select to download a PDF of the paper. So the submission management website gave me a quick link for the search-before-reading approach and made it salient by putting it somewhere I was likely to see it.**

Crikey!


* Sometimes anonymity breaks down, because the referee already knows the work (from a conference, say) or has a good guess who the author is (because the work extends the author's earlier work or is written in a distinctive style). I think that a referee has an obligation to let the editor know about the breakdown in anonymity, and the editor can decide how to proceed. Sometimes it makes sense to use the referee's report anyway.
** Actually I had already downloaded the PDF, because there was also a direct link in the invitation to referee the paper. But I only followed that link first, rather than the link to Editorial Manager, because I wanted to take a look at the paper before agreeing to referee it. In a different mood, I might have followed the agree link first.

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Rationing rationality 
I wish I had read Rogier De Langhe's A Unified Model of the Division of Cognitive Labor a while ago.

I recently submitted the final draft of Science and rationality for one and all, my paper on reconciling individual and collective rationality. Referees had worried that I was misrepresenting what philosophers of science thought about the relation between the two.

In a passage I would have quoted in my paper if I had read it earlier this year, De Langhe nicely lays out the way that the matter is usually understood: "The fundamental normative question when dividing cognitive labor is to what extent agents ought to take into account the actions of others. This question typically reduces to the specification of a normative balance between the rational and the social: 'leaders' choose that theory which they deem intrinsically superior, and 'followers' choose that theory which others choose." Looking for a balance between the rational and the social presumes that they are two competing standards, and the thought that leaders respond to the intrinsically superior theory suggests that they are the genuinely rational ones.

In his analysis, De Langhe defuses the tension. He allows the space of possible theories to be dynamic, so that scientists might either accept the available theory that looks best or search for a better one. He writes that this "makes it possible to shift the question instead to finding a normative balance between the actual and the possible: 'exploiters' exploit existing theories, and 'explorers' explore new theories."

In conclusion, he writes, "adoption and production pull in opposite directions." (Once I write it out, this is perhaps just what Kuhn called the essential tension in science. Kitcher was explicitly inspired by Kuhn, but De Langhe's model improves on Kitcher's in capturing that idea.)

For my purposes, it is important to add that there is no neutral way to determine the importance of exploiting and of exploring. Both reflect personal and social values.

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